Trump's Big Mistake
I have been held back on writing by being unable to catch up on my reading: the pace of events is such that the volume of news and analysis for me to process has become overwhelming. Nor has this torrent of information created much clarity as to what these events will amount to once the rubble stops bouncing around and the fires burn out.
I am speaking, of course, of the events around the world's biggest bottleneck: the Strait of Hormuz, through which huge volumes of oil, liquefied natural gas, nitrogen fertilizer and smaller but nevertheless very significant quantities of key supplies such as helium, have to pass in order to reach the world market. As someone who likes to draw conclusions and make predictions, this situation frustrates me. But it also offers me an excellent opportunity to simply marvel at the spectacular display of human folly.
But my readers await! And so, I am happy to report that I have discovered the exact nature of Trump's Big Mistake in launching his latest war against Iran.
First, a few words about the Strait of Hormuz. Although various clueless Western journalists were quick to start babbling about Iran "blockading" or "mining" the accursed Strait, no such events ever took place. Instead, ten or so ships attempting to pass through the Strait got set ablaze, by Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, one must presume. As a direct result, ship insurance rates shot up into the stratosphere and shipping through the Strait all but stopped. It did not stop entirely because Iran started granting safe passage to ships that complied with certain requirements: they couldn't have anything to do with the US or with Israel, the cargo had to be paid for in yuan (or renminbi), the Chinese currency, and there was also a hefty fee for safe passage. The course for safe passage lies through Iranian territorial waters, where Iranian forces can examine the ships closely.
Thus, Iran can still ship its oil to China, as it is accustomed to doing. Incidentally, Iran's oil production volumes are close to matching the record they set half a century ago. On the other hand, the Persian Gulf monarchies are precluded from selling their oil for dollars. Saudi Arabia still manages to sell some of its light sweet crude via its port on the Red Sea, delivered via a pipeline, at hugely inflated rates. That is a direct invitation to the Houthis in Yemen to show their support for their Iranian brothers by once again shutting down shipping through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, as they had when Israel attacked Gaza, and so this export route may not last either. What's more, quite a few of the oil, gas, fertilizer and other production facilities in the Gulf have been damaged or destroyed, making any future restoration of shipping volumes expensive and time-consuming even after hostilities end.
With this major development, yet another prediction of mine has come to pass. In my 2022 book "Ready... Set... Bolt!" in an essay titled "You can't always get what you pay for" I wrote:
"A day will come when offering someone a million dollars will get you punched in the face."
A rocket to your superstructure could be metaphorically compared to a punch in the face if you happen to be an oil tanker. Less metaphorically, a punch to the face has certainly been delivered to oil traders who thought that they were managing world trade in oil by trading bits of paper (or bits of computer code) known as oil futures. Oil prices are no longer set in the futures market; they are now set at the loading dock. Oil futures contracts were never directly about oil: the vast majority of them have always been settled with money rather than oil. But now buying an oil futures contract has even less to do with being able to take delivery of said oil for said amount at said time because much of the time the oil simply isn't available at any price.
Refineries around the world have to hunt around to find compatible blends of oil from specific sources, for which they now have to pay a premium, making the paper market for "benchmark crudes" rather beside the point. Overall, oil has suddenly become quite a lot less "fungible" as a commodity. This has had an immediate knock-on effect on oil distillates such as aviation kerosene which is no longer available in a growing number of locations, stranding tourists and business travelers. Even more significantly, shortages and high prices for nitrogen fertilizer, made from natural gas, are likely to cause a missed crop growing season in many countries, resulting food price inflation, malnutrition and, in the case of some poorer countries, even starvation.
Perhaps you have been able to gather all of this on your own by paying attention to the news — it's not that difficult. But what I'll describe next is not something that you will often hear. Trump's war on Iran is an epic failure on a purely conceptual level, as a foregone conclusion, that no new developments are likely to alter in any significant way.
To set the scene, let us briefly rewind to the Dozen-Day War, which lasted from 13 to 24 June 2025, during which Donald Trump claimed to have destroyed Iran's nuclear program. He didn't; we'll get back to this important detail in a little while. But what he did succeed in destroying was Iran's various opposition movements and networks of foreign operatives. They were outed in a feeble and harebrained attempt at a color revolution, in the hopes of effecting a quick and easy regime change in Teheran. They took to the streets where they were counted and tagged and their leaders were subsequently all neutralized. Thus, the Dozen-Day War left Iran bereft of opposition movements.
And yet Trump went in for an exact repeat. Here we have been forced to bear witness to a confluence of several spectacularly stupid ideas:
• That Trump can still effect a regime change in Teheran even after all of the opposition leaders have been killed during his previous failed attempt.
• That it is possible to destroy the Iranian state by assassinating its leadership.
• And, finally, after failing at both of the above, that it is still possible to "make a deal" (in Trump's primitive English) to end the conflict. Who does he plan to negotiate with? With the people he just killed?
Of course, not all Iranian leaders are dead. There is the new Rakhbar (supreme religious leader) Mojtaba Khamenei, son of Rakhbar Ali Khamenei, who was killed by an American air strike on his residence. What is notable is that the post of Rakhbar is not heritable. A Rakhbar is appointed in a process vaguely similar to that of appointing the Pope: in a conclave of great and respected Shia theologians. The appointment of the son of a Rakhbar as Rakhbar is highly irregular, especially given the fact that Mojtaba is not a great theologian, does not have a religious following and is generally considered something of a theological lightweight. So, why was he the one appointed?
I see three plausible answers to this question. First, Mojtaba is not a public figure of the sort that would be easy for the Americans to assassinate. In fact, nobody seems to know where he is. Second, his father died as a martyr and it is Mojtaba's sacred duty to avenge his death. His appointment as Rakhbar puts him in a position demand revenge. Third, Mojtaba fought with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 and has strong connections with it. It is the IRGC that will avenge Ali Khamenei's martyrdom, along with the deaths of all the other Iranians.
Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is a very curious organization. Unlike the generally agreeable and peace-minded Iranian leaders recently killed by Trump, the IRGC is made up of radical Shiites and the organization draws its inspiration from ancient Sufi military orders — imperial Persia's most successful organizations. The order's rules are based on the views of Imam Safi al-Din, the founder of the Safavi school, from the early 14th century. These principles underlie the IRGC's organizational activities. Their essence is simple: no family ties are allowed once a man is accepted into the order and is initiated into the closed military-religious class.
Shia Islam is complex and nuanced, but the current conflict has distilled the duties of a Shia Moslem into just two functions: to die as a martyr; and to avenge the death of a martyr. The first function — martyrdom — was duly fulfilled by all of the now dead Iranian leaders, from Ali Khamenei, killed at the outset, to Ali Larijani, killed more recently. The second function — revenge —will be carried out by the secretive factotums of the IRGC who emerge briefly from their tunnels hidden deep in the folds of endless mountains. They emerge, fire a volley of rockets, then go back into hiding.
This is a rather simplistic summary of what would take several years of intensive study to fully comprehend, but even this modicum of information would probably be greeted with complete incomprehension by Trump and his merry band of political assassins. The American understanding of war was formed by what were the only truly successful military campaigns the Americans ever fought — against the American Indians. These wars lasted for an entire century and were a great success: Indian land was stolen; Indians were either killed off or herded into reservations. Here, the tactic of political assassination worked wonderfully: kill the Indian chief and the Indian braves disband in disarray, not knowing whom to follow.
It is this erroneous notion — that political assassination paves the path to victory — that caused Trump and his motley crew of assassins to make Trump's Big Mistake. In the case of Iran, political assassination does not pave the path to victory; it just brings closer the assassin's own death.
Imagine Trump meeting with the new Rakhbar, Mojtaba Khameini with the goal of, as always, "making a deal":
Trump: "Howdy-doodle-do, I am the one and only Donald Trump. Who the hell are you, weird guy? I hope you are here to make a deal. I like to make deals. Nobody is better at making deals than me. Anyway, what's up?"
Khameini: "Hello, my name is Mojtaba Khamenei. You killed my father. Prepare to die."
How long will it take for the IRGC to exact revenge for such a large pile of martyrs? Forty is a sacred number in Islam, and public commemorations of the dead forty days after their death is a long-standing Islamic tradition. It is on the fortieth day that the soul of the deceased is said to mature and become ready for the afterlife. On that day, the soul of a martyr is believed to achieve peace if his death has been properly avenged. Fortieth-day commemorations of the deaths of notable martyrs, such as Ali Khamenei and Ali Larijani, are likely to be particularly important occasions. Ali Larijani was killed on March 17th; 40 days later will be April 26th. Until that time, closure seems unlikely. Of course, if the political assassinations continue, each one will restart the 40-day counter.
If you want to buy some oil before then, please make sure that you are not an American or an Israeli. And don't try to pay for it in dollars, or you might get punched in the face.
Iran stands alone, knowing the enemy, is only interest in their demise . When will Putin understand this, and China.
Although it has taken two false negotiations to prove USA/Isreal contempt for Iran and humanity to realise the destruction and failure Iran is desired.
I see this as a parasite trying to control the world order, in the end it is doomed, and with it us all.
Our hope of humanity is used as a weapon against anyone who seek negotiations as has been proven in iran and Ukraine.
a personal matter. I agree is a huge mistake but I will incline it was imposed
(at least suggested) by “Bibi’s operational branch: Mossad or equivalent”. In my
opinion the real mistake was to attack Iran (after the unsuccessful attempt in
2025 and consequences mentioned by you). The way they attacked, besides
horrifying all decent human, accelerated at least two processes:
economic and politic).
financial presence.
were coming as consequence. Iran had enough, and the moment the US and Israel chooses
to attack them was probably the best one for Iranians.